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Key points 
Despite the public perception in many member states that labour mobility has spiralled out of 
control, we find that labour mobility is low, particularly within the euro area. We make four main 
points in this paper. First, that the economic and financial crisis has affected mobility patterns by 
redirecting flows away from the periphery, thus showing the limits to the potential of labour 
mobility within the current eurozone – largely due to the negligible mobility of nationals from 
large countries hit by the crisis. Second, east-west mobility has not been fundamentally affected by 
the crisis, and ten years after the eastern enlargement the number of East Europeans living in EU15 
should be of no overall concern. Third, the long-term economic effects of mobility are uncertain, 
but potential negative effects are more likely to show up in sending countries than in receiving 
ones. Finally, we argue that, in view of the lessons learned from the economic crisis, the 
Commission and member states should adopt a longer-term view on labour mobility.  
Recommendations 
The Commission would do well to further modernise the tools related to job matching, namely the 
EURES system; it should initiate public employment service reforms and foster better and speedier 
recognition of qualifications. Data collection related to mobile citizens should also be improved by 
involving relevant national ministries, preferably within existing Commission structures. 
Strengthening the exchange of best practices among mobility networks should also be a priority. 
In order to improve mobility in the longer term, the Commission and member states should 
improve the mobility of third-country nationals – starting with those completing tertiary education 
at an EU institution and able to find employment. The aim of improving mobility gives new 
impetus to the ‘mother tongue + two foreign languages’ objective and the European Benchmark of 
Language Competences Initiative, in particular competence in the first foreign language taught at 
school. 
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Introduction1 
The right of free movement of persons is a 
cornerstone of the European Union and, 
according to a Eurobarometer survey, one of the 
most popular accomplishments of the EU. Since 
its establishment this right has been steadily 
built upon and expanded, in particular with 
respect to mobile EU workers. Barriers to 
(labour) mobility have been substantially 
reduced as part of creating the single market 
and also as a means to achieve the EU2020 goals 
of smart and inclusive growth. And yet the 
prevailing view in academic circles and among 
policy-makers is that intra-EU labour mobility is 
too low; too low to support the single labour 
market as anything but a notion and too low to 
play anything other than a modest role in 
helping to rebalance the eurozone after the 
crisis. 
Labour mobility with the European Union is 
low compared with the US. Less than 3% of EU 
citizens currently reside in another EU country; 
only one-tenth of its transatlantic reference 
point. The same is true for annual mobility 
flows between states, which in the EU do not 
even amount to 0.3% of its population – once 
more a tenth of the corresponding US statistic.  
Yet comparison with the US will most likely 
always leave Europe short because of language 
barriers, cultural differences, dissimilarities in 
education systems and a lack of cross-border 
personal ties. Still, a more mobile European 
workforce would bring significant benefits and 
more could be done to support those willing to 
work abroad. 
Even though intra-EU labour mobility seems 
low, in recent years it has been a controversial 
issue. The public debate in some countries 
depicts a situation where too many people are 
moving in search of jobs and welfare, 
particularly since enlargement and the end of 
                                                     
1 The conclusions and recommendations of this Policy 
Brief build on two recent reports: Barslund, M. and 
Matthias Busse (2014), Making the Most of Labour 
Mobility, CEPS; Brussels and Bertelsmann Stiftung 
(2014) (eds), Harnessing European Labour Mobility. 
Gütersloh.  
restrictions on free movement for East 
Europeans. At the same time, there is a fear that 
the brightest and best are moving abroad for 
work, thereby damaging the long-term growth 
and development prospects of sending 
countries. 
Labour mobility and the economic 
crisis 
The main engine of intra-EU mobility during the 
past decade has been the large income gap 
between the old member states (EU15) and the 
new member states in the east (EU10) that 
joined the EU from 2004 onwards. Most EU15 
countries introduced temporary restrictions that 
partially diverted mobility flows away from 
traditional destinations, such as Germany, 
towards Ireland and the UK, which did not 
impose restrictions. For Bulgaria and Romania 
restrictions were in place until 2014 for all but a 
few EU15 countries.  
Outflows from EU10 countries were indeed 
considerable. Poland and Latvia saw more than 
0.5% of their domestic populations move to the 
EU15 each year in the period 2004-08. Annual 
outflows from Lithuania reached 1% and almost 
1.5% of the population in Bulgaria (see Figure 
1). EU10 citizens had different preferences as 
destination countries; the most popular 
destinations were Spain and Italy (mainly for 
Romanians) while Poles largely sought 
opportunities in the UK and Germany.  
By comparison, mobility flows between EU15 
member states were negligent. Only around 
0.1% of EU15 citizens per year moved to another 
EU country in 2009. Income differences between 
the EU15 – a key driver of labour mobility – 
were not large enough to entice large numbers 
of workers to move. At the same time, 
unemployment rates across EU15 countries 
were low and converged in the pre-crisis period, 
thus further reducing incentives to seek 
employment abroad. 
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Figure 1. Annual change in stock of reporting countries’ citizens in the EU15, 
as a % of reporting countries’ population 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat, national statistical offices and Holland et al. (2011). 
The financial and subsequent debt crisis slowed 
down mobility flows from EU10 countries, as 
unemployment rose in EU15 countries. Since 
2011, statistics indicate that east-west mobility 
flows have rebounded somewhat but rates have 
remained lower than before the crisis.  
Significantly, the crisis triggered a redirection of 
mobility flows away from the periphery (Spain 
in particular) towards Germany, the UK and 
other northern European countries. While net 
immigration rates fell in the peripheral countries 
they were slow to turn into net emigration. The 
expiry of transitory restrictions on free 
movement may have played a role in this 
change of destination. 
High unemployment rates in the periphery have 
only caused limited mobility 
Within the EU15, the crisis caused a major 
reversal in the apparent economic convergence. 
The deteriorating labour market situation in 
southern Europe, in particular for young people, 
resulted in higher outflows of nationals of these 
countries. Absolute figures remained low, 
however. Five years into the crisis, the net 
emigration rates for Spanish and Italian 
nationals had only increased slightly, to less 
than 0.1%. Nationals of Greece and Portugal are 
somewhat more mobile, with a net emigration 
of around 4 individuals for every 1,000 
nationals. Ireland has seen somewhat more 
mobility, probably due to ties to the UK and the 
language advantage (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Net migration as a % of population by broad citizenship, 2012 
 
Source: Eurostat (2014). 
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Overall, wage differences seem to be a much 
more powerful driver of mobility than 
unemployment rates in the EU. This fact, and 
the evidence from young cohorts, suggests that 
we can expect only limited mobility within the 
EU15 even in the current economic climate. 
Moreover, the lag in response observed during 
this deep crisis makes labour mobility 
ineffective as a means of burden-sharing within 
the monetary union.  
The long-term economic impact of 
mobility is uncertain 
The mid- to long-term costs and benefits of 
labour mobility at member state level will 
depend on a range of factors, not least whether a 
country is at the sending or receiving end of 
mobility. In receiving countries, discussions 
have focused on concerns about the financial 
burden that mobile workers place on welfare 
states, in particular because access to social 
benefits by newcomers is sometimes considered 
to be too easy. Overall, the total stock of EU10 
citizens residing in EU15 countries should not 
cause much concern (Figure 3). For most 
countries the share of EU10 citizens is below or 
around just 2%. Moreover, available research 
does not find welfare provision in the host 
country to be an important incentive to migrate. 
On the contrary, most EU-migrants move for 
work reasons, are more likely to be in 
employment, and do not make more extensive 
use of welfare provisions than nationals.  
Figure 3. Stocks of EU10 citizens in EU15 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
At the same time, sending countries fear that it 
is mainly the brightest and best who are leaving, 
eroding the human capital base and thus long-
term growth and development prospects. In the 
case of EU15-periphery countries, the limited 
mobility flows and high unemployment rates, 
also for highly educated workers in these 
countries, mean that fears of a brain drain are
 currently not justified. However, for some EU10 
countries a continuation of past trends, if 
combined with limited return mobility, may 
impair economic development in the longer run 
(Figure 4). This is but one area of mobility where 
better data would allow for an improved 
assessment of the impact of longer-run trends.    
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Figure 4. Change in size of young cohort (15-24 year olds) of nationals from 2008 to 2013  
 
Note: Cohort aged 15-24 in 2008. Source: Own calculations based on LFS (2014).  
While it is difficult to predict mobility patterns, 
the overall potential for mobility is likely to 
decrease in the future, given the further 
convergence of income levels between east and 
west and the ageing of Europe’s workforce. This 
points to the need to consider measures to 
increase the attractiveness of the EU for foreign 
talent and to facilitate the mobility of third-
country nationals in order to foster growth and 
employment.  
No game changers: improve existing 
tools...  
Overall, the recent recession has not induced 
previously immobile workers to become more 
mobile, at least not in the larger member states. 
This leads us to conclude that successfully 
fostering mobility within EU15 countries 
requires tremendous effort.  
In general, those willing to move should not be 
discouraged from doing so by unnecessary 
barriers to mobility. The European Commission 
would do well to continue the modernisation of 
existing tools, in particular: 
Upgrade of the EURES system 
Until recently, the EURES online portal has 
received little attention and only covered 
between 30% and 40% of all vacancies in the EU. 
The recently proposed re-design of the EURES 
system is a step in the right direction, as are the 
proposals to facilitate better cooperation among 
public employment services and learning from 
best practices regarding mobility and cross-
border recruitment.  
Recognition and portability of qualifications 
With the recent update of the Directive on the 
recognition of professional qualifications, the 
EU has facilitated the recognition procedures 
and introduced the European Professional Card. 
When transposing the directive, member states 
should aim to speed up and simplify 
administrative procedures. Moving forward 
with the European qualification framework, 
which is still not fully implemented, will further 
help increase transparency.  
Learning from local and regional mobility 
projects 
Much is to be learned from the efforts put into 
many regional projects in Germany and 
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elsewhere aiming at recruitment from abroad, 
primarily from Spain and other southern 
European countries. These projects connect 
domestic SMEs that are unable to fill vacancies 
with jobseekers from abroad. While the strength 
of these projects lies in a bottom-up approach, 
the EU should evaluate their success closely, 
facilitate learning from best practices and also 
consider institutional support via the ESF. 
None of these measures will be game changers, 
however. That the Commission is aware of this 
is probably reflected in the meagre target for the 
number of young people matched to jobs via 
‘My first EURES Job’, which is 5,000 placements 
of young people. The initiative helps young 
people under 30 to find a job in another country 
by providing, among other things, financial 
support for the interview process 
... and think about the long term 
Breaking down mobility barriers and 
supporting mobile citizens will continue to be a 
dynamic process with no silver-bullet solutions. 
Three issues merit further attention with regard 
to the longer term deeper integration of 
European labour markets and, equally 
important, to better understand the impact of 
mobility. 
Improving foreign language competences  
Most EU member states have English as their 
first foreign language on the primary school 
curriculum. Yet, in terms of proficiency there are 
huge differences between the best and the worst 
performers. While important in its own right, 
the renewed focus on mobility should give fresh 
impetus to push ahead with the ‘mother tongue 
+ two foreign languages’ objective and the 
European Benchmark of Language 
Competences Initiative. 
Servicing mobile third-country nationals  
Obstacles to the mobility of third-country 
nationals abound, putting the EU at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis international competition 
for new skills and talents. Nevertheless, member 
states show little appetite to fully implement 
(optional) EU facilities for long-term residents, 
Blue Card holders, students and researchers. 
The Commission should strive to improve 
existing directives and avoid watering down its 
proposal for students and researchers. 
The need for better data 
More and better information is always called 
for, but in the case of labour mobility it is 
warranted.  There is little evidence at the 
European level as to the importance of key 
factors, such as what constitutes the main 
barriers (particularly in the current economic 
situation), the role of return migration or skills 
acquired abroad. Some data sources are 
probably available in individual member states. 
Others are hard to collect (e.g. longitudinal data 
on individuals). While no easy task, the 
Commission must think about how to improve 
upon this, not least to demonstrate the added 
value/mobility of European initiatives such as 
the ‘My first EURES job’ cited above.    
Do not expect too much 
The crisis has shown that there are clear limits to 
the potential of labour mobility within the 
current eurozone. This is mainly due to the 
limited mobility of nationals from the large 
countries hit by the crisis. At the same time, 
east-west mobility has not been fundamentally 
affected by the crisis. Even very adverse 
employment prospects in some countries have 
not induced more people to move, which 
indicates that we should not expect too much 
from any further elimination of administrative 
barriers to mobility – at least not in the short 
term.   
